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Summary: We estimate the Dollar exposure of German DAX corporations. Our results are 
based on a new time-variant, APT-based and panel econometric extension of the ex-
change-rate exposure model in the tradition of Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion (1990). 
Our stock market data consist of 28 performance indices of German DAX corporations. 
We include macroeconomic risk factors, and data on export and import involvement. Dollar 
exposures turn out to differ between exporters and importers and they are rather unstable 
over time. In contrast to most previous studies in the literature that find little evidence of 
exposure, we confirm recent results of Dominguez and Tesar (2001) who report that 
higher foreign involvement corresponds to higher exposure at least in Germany. Moreover, 
our findings suggest that exposure also depends on the prevailing level of the Dollar ex-
change rate.  
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1. Introduction 
The great majority of analysts seem to assume a negative correlation between the Ger-
man stock market and the Euro/$ exchange rate, respectively they assumed a positive 
correlation between the German stock market performance and the former DEM/$ rate. 
Comments in the business press are based on Germany’s economy dominated by export-
ing industries to which any appreciation of the German/European currency would mean 
“bad news” for the profitability of German companies, because of the worsened competi-
tiveness relative to Non-German companies.  
The framework business analysts might have in mind when discussing the conjunction 
between the value of the US-Dollar and the German stock market is known as the “expo-
sure to exchange rate risk” in the literature on international finance. It is defined as the 
change of the value of the firm in response to exchange rate fluctuations (Adler and Du-
mas, 1984). Dominguez and Tesar (2001a,b,c) give a detailed survey on the relevant lit-
erature and of existing channels of interaction between currency risks and firm values. Fol-
lowing along the lines of basic arguments, export-oriented firms would suffer from an ap-
preciation of the domestic (German) currency as its products become less affordable to 
foreign consumers. Even non-exporting firms could be negatively affected, because for-
eign competitors can sell their products more easily on the domestic market. However, it is 
obvious that there are also industries and firms who benefit from an appreciation of the 
domestic currency (and would suffer from a depreciation) because a considerable amount 
of them have much higher import shares than export shares. Even when focusing on ag-
gregate numbers, the persistence of Germany’s overall trade surplus is not given per se.1  
Thus, any appreciation might imply “good news” as well because of decreasing costs of 
production such that the conjectured correlation between DEM/$ changes and German 
stock market returns would be negative, in particular if companies of import-intensive and 
oil-importing industries (e.g. of the German power industry) are concerned. Moreover, if we 
think of the exchange rate exposure of the German economy in terms of the share value of 
                                            
1 During the year 2000, for instance, high oil prices have let to a share of imported goods and services in 
GDP that was almost of the same size as the corresponding share of exported goods and services in GDP. 
Germany’s exported goods and services amounted to DEM 1326 billion, while the German economy spent 
DEM 1311 billion for imported goods and services. At the same time, the German GDP was DEM 3976 bil-
lion (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2001). The trade surplus was even negative in aftermath of the first oil price 
shock in 1981/82.  
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the 30 biggest German corporations comprising the most important German stock market 
index, the XETRA-DAX, which is under investigation in this study, it is to be expected that 
these large firms engage in hedging activities.2 However, if German companies fully hedge 
their currency risk by using derivative products and other exchange rate hedging instru-
ments as, for instance, locating production in the United States3, then their stock price 
changes should not be correlated with any movement of the Dollar at all. 
Thus, an important question is whether exchange rate exposure is influenced through the 
channel of international trade. Previous research in this area was pioneered by Jorion 
(1990), who showed using a sample of US multinationals that a firm’s exchange rate ex-
posure is positively related to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. This result was ex-
tended and confirmed by Allayannis and Ofek (2001). He and Ng (1988) shows that Japa-
nese multinationals with higher exposure levels are related to higher export shares. How-
ever, looking at international evidence from eight countries, Dominguez and Tesar 
(2001b,c) conclude that they do not find a strong connection between trade and exposure, 
although there seems to be some evidence that a higher level of foreign sales corresponds 
to higher exposure for Germany (Dominguez and Tesar, 2001c, Table 10).  
This study takes a fresh look at the topic using German data. The econometric approach 
extends the existing literature by incorporating available information in a more complete 
and efficient way than it was done in previous research. The usual way of first testing and 
then explaining exchange rate exposure consists in performing a two-stage procedure. All  
firm or industry returns in the sample are regressed on the market portfolio and the return 
of the relevant exchange rate, which in most applications is measured as the dollar ex-
change rate (see, for instance, Dominguez and Tesar, 2001b). The coefficient on the ex-
change rate represents the resulting estimate of the exchange rate exposure. The pres-
ence of the market portfolio leads to a CAPM interpretation of this first stage regression. 
However, the reason of choosing a CAPM specification is not to test the CAPM but to iso-
late the variation coming from the exchange rate risk. Following this intention more thor-
oughly than in previous research, we extend the framework by applying APT instead of 
CAPM in the first step, i.e. by controlling for other potential macroeconomic risks such as 
inflation and interest rate fluctuations. The main reason for this extension can be seen in 
                                            
2 Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) report that larger firms are more likely to use hedging instruments than 
are smaller companies. 
3 See, for instance, Dominguez (1998) for a discussion of hedging instruments. 
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the nature of macroeconomic factors that have asymmetric influences on both stock re-
turns and exchange rates. Prominent candidates are divergent monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, as well as asynchronous output movements that might drive stock returns and ex-
change rates in different ways such that any prediction of the prevailing direction of corre-
lation between both financial market prices is difficult and regime-dependent (see Gavin, 
1989). From a more technical point of view, we isolate exchange rate movements and 
other macroeconomic variables with respect to the market factor by following an orthogo-
nalization procedure suggested by McElroy and Burmeister (1988).  
Going beyond most studies applying the two-step procedure, we do not assume that mag-
nitude and direction of exposure is stable over time, an assumption that is refuted by evi-
dence obtained in Santis and Gerard, 1997, 1998, Tai, 2000, and Allayannis and Ihrig, 
2000). In order to take account of time-varying risks, we use a moving-window regression 
approach for all firms in our sample. Moreover, in order to receive results of the overall 
German exchange rate exposure, we extend the moving-window approach by applying 
rolling-panel estimation techniques.  
The usual second step of the procedure consists of relating the exchange rate exposure to 
potential covariates, where the trade hypothesis plays a prominent role. The standard way 
is to run cross-sectional regressions with the individual exchange rate betas used as left-
hand side variables. This strategy was followed, for instance, by Dominguez and Tesar 
(2001bc) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who test whether exchange rate exposure is 
affected by the presence of foreign currency derivatives. However, given the time-varying 
nature of the exposure data at the firm level that we obtain in the first step, we are able go 
beyond the traditional approach: We propose to exploit available first-step information in a 
more efficient way by implementing panel data estimation and SUR (seemingly unrelated 
regression) techniques. Furthermore, the construction of aggregate currency exposure 
time series enables us to test for cointegration between exchange rate exposure and na-
tional export and import data which in turn allows us to focus on general macroeconomic 
conclusions for the German economy.  
We base our analysis on performance indices from the German DAX corporations of the 
time 1977-1995. We find a rather unstable association between stock returns and 
DEM/Dollar changes. Estimated Dollar exposures are significantly negative at the begin-
ning of the 80’s, but they change their sign in the late 80’s and early 90’s. Cointegration 
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tests reveal that the association strongly depends on the import-export structure and the 
existing DEM/$ level.  
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2,  we measure the stability of German ex-
change rate exposures within the APT framework. Section 3 presents our econometric 
approach that exploits the nature of financial panel data. Section 4 informs about esti-
mated exchange rate exposures, and in Section 5 results are briefly summarized.   
 
2. Measuring exchange rate exposure: Tests of stability within the APT 
framework 
2.1. Exchange Rate Exposure, its measurement, and explanatory factors 
The expected reaction of stock markets to dollar changes can be captured in the simple 
stochastic equation  
(1)   ,ittititi dr εβα ++=  
where rit is the stock market return of company i at time t, and dt is the return of the DEM/$ 
exchange rate at time t. Most comments in business newspapers, for instance, are based 
on a strong positive foreign involvement of German firms, and they expect the slope pa-
rameter itβ to have a positive sign, because they see rising dollars (i.e. a rising DEM/$, 
respectively a depreciation of the Euro)  as driving force of good stock market prospects. 
This approach looks rather ad hoc, but in fact, Adler and Dumas (1980, 1984) have shown 
analytically that exposure to currency risk can be measured within a simple linear regres-
sion framework, in which the stock market return is regressed on a constant and the ex-
change rate (in practical applications, proxies of market portfolios are included as second 
explanatory variable). The exchange rate exposure boils down to the partial derivation with 
respect to the exchange rate, i.e. to the slope parameter of the bivariate regression which 
requires the assumption of a stable iit ββ =  for all t. 
This line of research was followed in an influential paper by Jorion (1990), who analysed 
the exposure to exchange rates of U.S. multinationals. Most applications are for U.S. fi-
nancial markets, with important exceptions. Bodnar and Gentry (1993) provided evidence 
for Canada, Japan and the U.S., Bailey and Chung (1995) studied the effects of exposure  
to currency and political risks on equity returns in Mexico, and He and Ng (1998) as well 
as Dominguez (1998) investigated the exchange rate exposure of Japanese corporations. 
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Publications with a special focus on the relationship between exchange rates and stock 
market returns in Germany are rare.4  
Still only little empirical research can be found on determinants of currency exposure. 
Jorion (1990) finds that exposure varies systematically across the companies under con-
sideration, depending on firm characteristics such as the percentage of foreign operations. 
Bodnar and Gentry (1993) compare industry-level exchange rate exposures for Canada, 
Japan and the USA. They find that between 20 and 35 per cent of industries have statisti-
cally significant exchange rate exposures that are larger for Canada and Japan than for 
the USA. He and Ng (1998) examine a sample of 171 Japanese multinational companies 
and find that higher exposure levels are related to higher export shares. However, looking 
at international evidence from eight countries, Dominguez and Tesar (2001b,c) conclude 
that they do not find a strong connection between trade and exposure, although for Ger-
many there seems to be some evidence that a higher level of foreign sales corresponds to 
higher exposure (Dominguez and Tesar, 2001c, Table 10). 
 
2.2. Estimation of time-variant exchange rate exposure within the APT framework 
using German Data 
A problem with the usual way of testing and measuring exchange rate exposure is that it 
overlooks that in Adler and Dumas (1984), stock prices and exchange-rate movements are 
both endogenous variables and that third influences might drive both exchange rates and 
stock markets simultaneously. Gavin (1989) provides a macroeconomic framework that 
shows how both financial variables interact, and how both markets react to changes in in-
terest rates, output, and, in particular, to anticipated and unanticipated changes of mone-
tary and fiscal policy. Table 1 illustrates channels of influence. Employing the Euro-
pean/German case, we see that monetary expansions (contractions) of the central bank 
would lead to both positive (negative) stock returns on the one hand, and positive (nega-
tive) DEM/$ movements on the other hand, because the Euro depreciates (appreciates). 
Thus, the correlation between both market returns would be positive. In case of a fiscal 
expansion, however, the correlation would be negative, when we start from the reasonable 
                                            
4 Recent exceptions are provided by Glaum et al. (1998), and in some German written studies by Müller 
(1998), Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998), Entorf (2000), Jamin (1999), and Schieszl (2000).  
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assumption that, in general, fiscal expansion is considered as „good news“ for short-run 
output fluctuations.  
 
Table 1: Monetary and fiscal policy changes, and their impact on the correlation be-
tween stock market returns and exchange-rate movements 
  
Stock prices 
 
Exchange rates 
 
Monetary  
Expansion 
 
Falling interest rates → lowering 
user costs of capital → rising stock 
prices 
 
(i) falling interest rates → increas-
ing  capital exports → depreciation 
 
(ii) increasing prices on the goods 
market → depreciation 
 
 
Fiscal  
Expansion 
 
(i) Increasing output →  rising profits 
→ rising stock prices („good news“) *)
 
(ii) Increasing interest rates → higher 
user costs of capital  → decreasing 
stock prices („bad news“) 
 
 
Rise of interest rates → increasing 
capital imports → appreciation  
 
*) In general, fiscal expansion is considered as „good news“ for short-run output fluctua-
tions. 
 
Thus, to disentangle the partial impact stemming from exchange-rate fluctuations, it is 
necessary to control for other disturbing macroeconomic influences. A well known strategy 
to achieve this aim is the use of “Arbitrage Pricing Theory” (APT), pioneered by Ross 
(1976). According to the APT, the variation of stock returns is explained by a K-factor 
model of the form  
(2)    
Kr B fµ ε= + +  
where r  is  the vector of returns of N stock prices, µ  is the vector of expected returns of 
the N securities, Kf  is a vector of realisations of K factors, including exchange-rate fluctua-
tions, B  a NxK matrix of factor sensitivities of the N securities to the K factors, and ε  is 
the vector of error terms of the N securities. The vector of expected returns can be de-
composed into 
(3)    
0 KBµ λ λ= + , 
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where 0λ  is the risk-free rate, and Kλ  is the vector of risk premia for the K factors. Thus, 
estimating APT-models allows for the joint determination of factor sensitivities, with special 
interest in the coefficients representing exchange rate exposures, i.e. in the reaction of 
single assets to exchange rate movements, and of risk premia, which reveal whether in-
vestors have to be compensated by a higher expected return because the exchange rate 
risk or other risks are not diversifiable.  
Substituting equation (3) into equation (2), rearranging terms and observing variables as 
times series results in  
(4)   ttKKt fBr ελλ +++= )(0 . 
The APT model, presented in equation (4), is a system of seemingly unrelated non-linear 
regressions with (N-1)K cross-equations restrictions (imposing that the s'λ  are the same 
for each of the N securities). In our study, it is estimated using the ITNLSUR (Iterated Non-
linear Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) technique developed by Burmeister and McElroy 
(1988). 
Our sample of stocks includes 28 leading German corporations comprising the DAX (the 
leading index of the Frankfurt stock exchange) on the 31st of March 1995.5 They represent 
about 70 % of total turnover in German stocks during the sample period.6 Monthly returns 
for the period from April 1977 through March 1995 are adjusted for dividends and capital 
increases and splits according to adjustment factors obtained from KKMDB, i.e the Ger-
man Karlsruhe data base for financial time series (“Karlsruher Kapitalmarktdatenbank”) in 
order to obtain total returns of the assets.7  
Before estimating the model, macroeconomic risk factors have to be selected. According 
to the “Discounted Cash Flow Model”, which assumes that prices of assets are determined 
through their expected discounted dividend payments, factors have to be selected that are 
potentially responsible for the determination of these payments. For our investigations, we 
use a survey indicator of the German business climate, the inflation rate, the term struc-
                                            
5 VIAG and Henkel had to be excluded as their returns are not available for the whole estimation period. 
6 See Sauer, A. (1994), p. 102. 
7 KKMDB was supported by the German National Science Foundation (DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft) to provide a scientific use file of German stock prices and performance indices. For further informa-
tion see http://finance.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de/Forschung/kkmdb.html.  
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ture, a (residual) market factor, and, in particular, the U.S.-Dollar. These factors are similar 
to those proposed by Chen et al. (1986), who pioneered the macroeconomic variables ap-
proach of estimating the APT. Since only unexpected components of macroeconomic time 
series can influence asset returns in efficient capital markets, we calculate unexpected 
variation applying ARMA- and ARIMA-filtering techniques. To isolate the effect of ex-
change-rate returns from the general market factor, we follow the procedure suggested by 
McElroy and Burmeister (1988). They draw attention to the fact that the market return has 
to be orthogonalized with respect to the explanatory macroeconomic variables in order to 
capture the (residual) market risk that is not explained by other systematic risk factors. 
Therefore we include the residual market factor that is represented by the residuals of an 
OLS-regression of the market return on the unexpected components of macroeconomic 
variables. 
In detail, macroeconomic risks are based on the following variables:  
• Business climate: Monthly change rate of the “ifo business climate” (“ifo-
Geschaeftsklimaindex”), an acknowledged leading indicator of the German business 
cycle published by ifo institute (Munich). 
• Inflation: Monthly change rate of the German consumer price index (“Lebenshaltungs-
kostenindex”) calculated by the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Wiesbaden). 
• Term structure: Difference between the 10-year rate on German government bonds 
and the 1-month money market rate, both calculated by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(Frankfurt). 
• Residual market factor: This variable is estimated on the basis of the DAFOX 
(“Deutscher Aktien-Forschungs-Index”), a broad German stock market index generated 
for scientific research purposes, obtained from the KKMDB data base. DAFOX is a 
Laspeyres performance index including all stocks traded at Frankfurt stock exchange. It 
is a generally acknowledged substitute for the overall German stock market portfolio.  
• US-dollar: Growth rate of the closing price of the US-dollar at the Frankfurt foreign ex-
change market. 
After separating the total estimation period into four subperiods, 04/77 – 12/79, 01/80 – 
12/85, 1/86 – 12/90 and 01/91 – 03/95, estimation results reveal that the exposure to ex-
change-rate risk is not constant over time. The sensitivity of DAX stock returns with re-
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spect to Dollar returns is documented in Table 2. During the first period 04/77 – 12/79, the 
relationship is mostly positive, but only four of all t-values are above 1.96. The sign of the 
Dollar exposure turns negative during the second period 01/80 – 12/85, where 22 of all 28 
factor sensitivities are significant at the 5 % level. The period coincided with the second oil 
shock and a sharply rising dollar, which led to increasing input costs of the German econ-
omy. The prospect of high prices for foreign inputs seemed to have a negative impact on 
German stock prices.  
Again the sign reverses to a positive association during the third and fourth period from 
01/86 – 12/90 and 01/91 – 03/95, respectively. Out of 28 factor sensitivities, 26 are posi-
tive and 10 are significant during the third period, whereas in the fourth period even all 28 
coefficients are positive, out of which 12 are significant. The rising German trade surplus 
from the mid-eighties on (see Figure 3 in Section 4) might have let exporters more strongly 
profit from a rising dollar.  
The estimates of the remaining factor sensitivities and of risk premia are displayed in the 
Appendix. Table A1 displays estimated factor sensitivities for the business climate vari-
able. They, too, turn out to be unstable depending on the time period under consideration. 
During the first period from 04/77 – 12/79, the relationship turns out to be negative, which 
is counterintuitive since an improved business climate should result in improved expecta-
tions of firm profits. The sign is positive throughout the remaining estimation periods. Re-
sults for the inflation variable are shown in Table A2. During the first three periods, signs of 
factor sensitivities are negative. This might imply, contrary to the Fisher hypothesis, that 
investors expect a negative impact of increasing money depreciation on firm profits. The 
relationship becomes positive in the fourth period from 01/91 – 03/95, when 26 of the 28 
estimated factor sensitivities are significant on the 5 % level. 
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Table 2: Company-specific Dollar exchange rate exposures based on APT-modelling  
 04/77-12/79 01/80-12/85 01/86-12/90 01/91-03/95 
Allianz  -0.004606 -0.118845 0.058385 0.164780 
 (-0.072073) (-2.942663) (0.664388) (1.734495) 
BASF  0.102862 -0.107094 0.048737 0.280191 
 (1.392689) (-3.800522) (0.590938) (3.094935) 
Bayer  0.096361 -0.097310 0.027313 0.142051 
 (1.408947) (-4.259209) (0.346880) (1.640058) 
BMW  0.027181 -0.060796 0.188607 0.334268 
 (0.257188) (-1.580642) (1.661649) (2.759314) 
Bayer. Vereinsbank  0.257188 -0.079241 0.158728 0.158847 
 (0.271493) (-2.750427) (2.005301) (1.767028) 
Commerzbank  0.110512 -0.205454 0.250561 0.031369 
 (1.593226) (-5.073234) (2.932397) (0.400595) 
Continental  -0.278017 -0.109992 0.373449 0.285933 
 (-1.721159) (-2.186452) (2.358318) (1.860148) 
Daimler-Benz  0.001972 -0.117528 0.310095 0.515357 
 (0.029095) (-3.271778) (3.261456) (5.566667) 
Degussa  0.195366 -0.094757 0.420750 0.386453 
 (2.651987) (-2.705430) (3.488749) (3.412070) 
Deutsche Bank  0.064943 -0.144234 0.277771 0.124914 
 (1.061435) (-4.775309) (2.954908) (1.806802) 
Dresdner Bank  0.145019 -0.195016 0.129032 0.012332 
 (2.437319) (-4.933935) (1.617576) (0.164029) 
Deutsche Babcock  0.039512 -0.131928 0.332366 0.249980 
 (0.409046) (-2.375848) (2.390498) (1.773243) 
Hoechst  0.123310 -0.110131 -0.043001 0.268596 
 (1.497804) (-4.744283) (-0.471778) (2.855792) 
Hypobank  0.032789 -0.072864 0.292017 0.055338 
 (0.426645) (-1.682275) (3.511323) (0.682146) 
Karstadt  0.178303 -0.056928 0.253886 0.377474 
 (1.412288) (-1.149292) (1.757769) (3.214940) 
Kaufhof  0.258629 -0.065819 0.418875 0.214490 
 (2.069859) (-1.531888) (3.094912) (1.681324) 
Linde 0.014598 -0.101333 0.146101 0.367441 
 (0.164061) (-3.547084) (1.808238) (4.378376) 
Lufthansa  0.173477 0.054114 0.014847 0.267151 
 (1.007329) (0.865635) (0.113544) (1.391007) 
MAN  0.093140 -0.179159 0.014636 0.660426 
 (-1.081803) (-4.410100) (0.106041) (5.583742) 
Mannesmann  0.022406 -0.120999 0.056997 0.432408 
 (0.212827) (-3.443393) (0.416643) (3.618515) 
Metallgesellschaft  -0.008916 -0.106816 -0.025510 0.228537 
 (-0.072916) (-2.477040) (-0.179936) (0.971785) 
Preussag  -0.035825 -0.070974 0.286024 0.555758 
 (-0.242432) (-1.375417) (1.857735) (4.091376) 
RWE  0.121377 -0.059607 0.145243 0.110953 
 (1.369300) (-2.030123) (1.178403) (1.359883) 
Schering  0.282589 -0.112220 0.044985 0.184105 
 (0.0129) (-3.127653) (0.402639) (1.536119) 
Siemens  0.155162 -0.080959 0.214002 0.277545 
 (2.985798) (-3.212608) (2.297772) (3.965073) 
Thyssen  0.213323 -0.111529 0.024964 0.465127 
 (1.903968) (-2.541879) (0.219229) (3.752378) 
VEBA  0.089848 -0.074557 0.129873 0.124495 
 (0.816545) (-2.496618) (1.462866) (1.507106) 
VW  0.067549 -0.171268 0.138990 0.189876 
 (7.113015) (-3.474283) (1.272088) (1.361675) 
 
Notes: Estimation of APT factor sensitivities based on model (2) to (4). t-statistics in paren-
theses. 
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Table A3 shows the results for the term structure variable. Throughout all estimation peri-
ods the relationship between changes in the term structure and stock returns is negative. 
The sensitivity becomes even stronger over time: the number of companies with significant 
factor sensitivities increases from 7 in 04/77 – 12/79 to 24 in 01/91 – 03/95. This result is 
in accordance with the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure, as an in-
crease in the term structure implies the expectation of increasing future interest rates, and 
therefore a heavier discounting of future profits. Table A4, finally, displays parameter esti-
mates for the residual market factor. All estimated coefficients are positive and highly sig-
nificant. As expected, the market return covers the most important influence of individual 
asset returns.During the first period from 04/77 – 12/79, the risk premia for the business 
climate, inflation, the term structure and the Dollar are significant at the 95 % level (see 
Table A5) which implies that these risks are not diversifiable, and therefore investors have 
to be compensated with a higher expected return for bearing these risks. During the sec-
ond period from 01/80 – 12/85, only the dollar and the residual market risk are significant. 
The third period from 01/86 – 12/90 shows inflation to be significant, whereas in the fourth 
period none remains significant. This might reflect the increasing efficiency of markets, 
where due to the global integration of financial markets and sophisticated derivative in-
struments more and more risks can be hedged, such that the exchange rate risk is not 
priced.  
However, as already stressed in the introduction to this study, the main purpose of 
estimating an APT model is not to see whether macroeconomic risks are priced, but to 
isolate exchange rate exposure and to test its stability. The obvious result is that the 
exposure to Dollar movements are statistically significant and time-variant.  
 
3. Analysing factors of time-varying exchange rate exposure:                 
A new econometric rolling-panel approach 
Most applications of exchange rate exposure models are based on two-step procedures, 
pioneered by the work of Jorion, 1990. In the first step,  by running N time series regres-
sions, the stock returns of a sample of N companies are regressed on the exchange rate 
(the Dollar). Step 2 consists of regressing the exchange rate (Dollar) exposure (i.e., the 
slope parameter of the first step) on indicators of foreign involvement. Jorion (1990), for 
instance, employs the ratio of foreign to total sales:  
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Econometric problems arise, because estimated exposures are based on common sam-
ples, such that they are not i.i.d and  υi ´s are correlated. In our estimations (see below),  
that makes use of pooled cross-sectional information, we propose to tackle this problem by 
applying the method of “seeming unrelated regressions” (SUR), which takes the correla-
tion between different υi´s into account. Jorion (1990) has proposed a second alternative 
procedure that was also applied by Bodnar, Gentry (1993) in a similar fashion. Jorion sug-
gests to insert the dollar exposure in the first equation : 
(6)    ittiitiiit dXdr εγγα +++= 10  
Expected signs look as follows: 
(7)  


<<⇒<<
>>⇒>>+=∂
∂
0,00,0
0,00,0
10
10
10 γγ
γγγγ
Xif
Xif
X
d
r  
 The advantage of the one-step procedure is its higher efficiency because time se-
ries and cross-sectional information can be used in a GLS framework, for instance. The 
disadvantage, however, lies in the fact that cross terms might suffer from the problem of 
both multicollinearity of both explanatory variables and from difficult interpretation. Now the 
dollar exposure is no longer just the regression coefficient, but it depends on the level of 
foreign activities, and more than one estimated parameter is involved to calculate it, as can 
be seen from equation (7). This leads to potential ambiguities and misinterpretations which 
make this alternative less appealing. These disadvantages have let us to stick with the 
traditional two-step procedure, though in a modified and more efficient way. 
Some should be taken into account that would allow some improvement compared to the 
conventional approach.  
• First, it should be possible to include the panel information Xit instead of the cross-
sectional information Xi (as is the case in equation (5)).  
• Second, currency exposure is not stable over time but depends on current knowledge 
of market participants. Beliefs and expectations, however, do not depend on the whole 
history of financial markets, but rather depend on limited information sets, as can be 
seen from our time-variant exposure estimates in Section 2 and other examples of un-
stable coefficient estimates on CAPM and APT modelling in the literature (see, for in-
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stance, De Santis and Gérard, 1998, for time varying currency risks in an international 
asset pricing model). Thus, estimations should be time-variant, and they should give 
much more weight on recent observations. 
• Third, financial time series are available as high frequency data, whereas covariates 
from non-financial markets such as indicators of foreign involvement Xit are not. Never-
theless, high frequency data should be used in a more disaggregate, non-averaged 
way ,  in order to avoid loss of information.  
• Fourth, simultaneity matters. This might not be the case when single companies are 
considered, since for them it can be argued that any movement of the Dollar is exoge-
nous. However, when exchange rate exposures are estimated for the whole economy, 
as we intend to do in our paper, then macroeconomic theory has taught us that third 
factors might influence the correlation between exchange rates and equity returns. 
Thus, as a matter of fact, the direction of causation is unclear, such that it might be 
preferable to consider a correlated instead of a causal relationship, as was already 
suggested by Adler and Dumas (1984).  
We proceed by performing the following modified two-step procedure. In step I,  
Niit ,...,1, =β , i.e. firm-specific and time-variant exchange rate exposures are estimated. 
We do so by running rolling regressions: 
STEP I: 
(8)   Nidr ijjititij ,...,1, =++= εβα  
    ttttj ,1,...,2,1 −+−+−= ττ  
    ,,...,2,1 Tt ++= ττ   
where τ  represents the size of the rolling window, and T  is the number of total time series 
observations. Based on the APT multi-factor model, the extended multivariate estimation 
of the exchange rate exposure looks as follows, where the exchange rate is measured by 
the unanticipated residual from ARIMA-modelling (see Section 2.2), and where f includes 
all (unanticipated) factors (incl.  the residual market factor) except  the exchange rate fac-
tor, which is represented by ujd : 
(8’)   ijtit
u
jitiij fbdr εβα +++= '  
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In order to achieve overall (macro) estimates of the currency exposure, itβ  can be re-
stricted to be identical to tβ  for all Ni ,...,1=  by using rolling-GLS (SUR) or rolling-panel 
estimation techniques:  
(9)    ijjtiij dr εβα ++=  
A restricted rolling multi-factor version needs to be changed accordingly: 
(9’)    ijtt
u
jtiij fbdr εβα +++= ' . 
In step 2, we analyse the relationship between exchange rate exposures and foreign in-
volvement. Exposure and its determinants can be identified using both firm-specific and 
time-specific information. Moreover, cross-correlated residuals can be accounted for by 
estimation of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR): 
STEP II: 
(10)    TtNiX ititiiit ,...,1,,...,1,10 ==++= υγγβ  
     Tij I⊗= )()(var συ   
SUR is (asymptotically) efficient under the assumption of given exchange rate exposures 
that are known up to random measurement errors, and these residuals are allowed to 
have a non-zero contemporaneous covariance, for instance due to unanticipated shocks 
that hit all corporations simultaneously (in form of general crashes, for instance).  
Overall macroeconomic estimates can be achieved by restricted SUR or panel estimation: 
(11)    ititiit X εγγβ ++= 10   
Applied estimation has to take account of data restrictions, because only limited informa-
tion is available at the firm level, particularly when high frequency data would be needed. 
Nevertheless, we are still able to identify the impact from different regimes of foreign in-
volvement by relating exchange rate exposures to aggregated trade activities, available 
from macroeconomic foreign trade statistics: 
(12)    ittiitittiiit XX υγγβυγγβ ++=++= 1010 or, . 
Does the modified two-step procedure meet the requirements described above? First, the 
approach has the potential to go beyond the conventional cross-sectional approach by 
incorporating panel information, though information on both firm and time in Xit is not avail-
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able in the present paper. Second, unstable relationships and limited information sets are 
taken into account by the proposed moving window procedure. Third, the potential of high 
frequency data can be saved because exchange rate exposures are estimated in the step 
by exclusively focusing on financial data. According to the fourth requirement, macroeco-
nomic influences are now considered in STEP I, see equation (8’) and (9’). As regards cor-
relation versus causation, we provide additional empirical evidence based on t-values on 
estimated Dollar exposures of the bivariate regressions (8) and (9). Here, t-statistics, i.e. 
)ˆ(/ˆ βσβ , which can be interpreted as exposure estimates weighted by their importance 
in terms of estimated standard errors, have the wanted effect of not depending on the 
choice of the left-hand side variable, i.e., the same t-value would arise if we take the Dollar 
as dependent variable and the stock return as explanatory variable, as can be shown eas-
ily. Calculation of the rolling t-value from equation (8) gives: 
tddtrr
tdr
t
t
t
t SS
S
R
R
Rt
2
2
2
2
,
)1(
)2( =−
−= τ  
where 
2
1
2
1
111
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trr
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t
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t
tj
tdr
ddSrrS
rrddddrrS
−=−=
==−−=
∑∑
∑∑∑
+−=+−=
+−=+−=+−=
ττ
τττ ττ  
The proof follows directly from the symmetry of involved variances and covariances.
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4. Results from rolling panel regressions 
4.1. Results, STEP I 
The (unconditional) Adler-Dumas Dollar exposure is not constant over time, as can be 
seen from Table 3, which provides GLS (panel) estimates of equation (9) for different time 
periods. The estimate is significantly negative until 1985, and turns out to be significantly 
positive thereafter. For the total period, the Dollar exposure is positive and significant, but 
the estimate is only about 0.097, which is much lower than the estimated absolute values 
from the sub-samples.  
 
Table 3: Estimation of Dollar exposure using fixed-company effects 
 
  
Dependent variable: rit , measured in: 
  
1974-1995 
 
1974-1979 
 
1980-1985 
 
1986-1989 
 
1991-1995 
dt 
 
0.097 
(4.0) 
-0.269 
(6.2) 
-0.257 
(7.4) 
0.484 
(8.1) 
0.358 
(9.1) 
2R  0.0001 0.0092 0.0197 0.0250 0.0330 
BFN-DW 1.92 1.97 2.09 1.84 2.12 
 
Notes: Sample: Monthly observations from 28 DAX corporations of the period 1974:02 – 1995:03 (7112 ob-
servations). Estimates include company-specific constants and consider company-specific heteroskedasticity 
under the assumption that residuals are contemporaneously uncorrelated. Estimates are based on FGLS 
with variances estimated from a first-stage pooled OLS regression. In parentheses: t-values based on 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. BFN-DW: Panel-DW statistic (Bhargava, 
Franzini and Narendranathan, 1982). 
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According to the procedure described in equation (8), the complete picture emerges from 
Figure 1, which shows the Dollar exposure of all 28 companies over time. The window 
size, τ , is chosen at 48 months. The estimated coefficient of each rolling regression period 
is displayed at the time of the midterm period, more precisely at 2/τ−t , where t is the 
final observation of the moving window estimation. Two preliminary observations are in 
order: a) Dollar exposures are rather unstable over time, b) the majority of firm-specific 
exposures is rather low in the 80s and quite high in the 90s. Going deeper into details, we 
observe that for energy oriented corporations like VEBA and RWE rather strong negative 
exposures are estimated for the beginning of the eighties, i.e. at the time of the second oil 
crisis, when high invoices for imported oil had to be paid, whereas in case of the more ex-
port oriented car-producers exposures are quite high at the time of a low Dollar and high 
export shares, i.e. at the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s (see DAIMLER, for 
instance).  
In Figure 2, these observations are confirmed by inspecting the results from rolling regres-
sions, in which the Dollar exposure is restricted to be the same across all companies 
(B_BIV, see equation (9)). The time series from these estimates is depicted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 also displays results according to equation (9’), i.e. the (conditional) coefficient on 
the DM/$ returns in a multivariate framework (B_APT). As before, estimated itβ  are dis-
played at time .2/τ−t  Movements are less pronounced than in the bivariate (uncondi-
tional) case, but general tendencies keep the same. In the aftermath of both oil price 
shocks 1975/76 and 1981/82, estimates of the Dollar exposure are negative, suggesting 
that a further increase of the DM/$ was “bad news” to expected profits of German compa-
nies because of suspected rising input costs, in particular due to more expensive oil im-
ports. These concerns were reinforced by the prevailing Dollar price level, which was quite 
high in the beginning of the 80’s and still rising until 1985 (and quickly falling thereafter as 
a consequence of the Plaza agreement , see Figure 3). 
These situations contrast sharply with the end of the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s, 
when Germany’s trade structure has become strongly export oriented, backed by a weak 
Dollar (see Figure 3). In situations like this, a rise of the DM/$ is good news to the German 
economy, because the car industry and other export-oriented industries driving the Ger-
man economy are expected to benefit from the more favourable terms of trade. In fact, the 
estimate of the Dollar exposure turns out to be positive since 1987.  
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Figure 1: Dollar exposure of DAX corporations
BASFAllianz Bayer BMW Bay. Vereinb. Commerzb.
Conti Daimler Degussa Deutsche B. Dresdner B. DTBAB
Hoechst Hypo Karstadt Kaufhof Linde Lufthansa
MAN Mannesmann Metallges. Preussag RWE Schering
Siemens Thyssen VEBA VW
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Figure 2: Conditional and unconditional Dollar exposure
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Figure 3: The Dollar and the German net export ratio
Note: See the text for further details
Note: left scale: export share - import share, right scale: DM/$
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4.2. Results, STEP II 
Our observations based on Figures 1 and 2 suggest to assess the influence of trade as 
well as of the level of the Dollar rate on the exchange rate exposure. Table 4, showing un-
restricted results in the sense of equation (12), confirms previous suppositions: 1) the 
higher is the DM/$ level, the lower is the Dollar exposure; 2) the higher is the export ratio, 
the higher is the Dollar exposure (24 out of 28 companies reveal a positive sign); 3) the 
higher is the import share, the lower is the Dollar exposure (21 out of 28 companies show 
a negative sign).  
Restricted results (assuming identical parameters for all firms) are presented in Table 5. 
They confirm in a more compact way what has already been found in Table 4. As further 
checks of robustness, we have measured the Dollar exposure as a t-value (i.e. the t-value 
on the Dollar return) and we used the difference between the export share and import 
share as explanatory variable, in order to dispel potential concerns about multicollinearity.  
All results confirm previous findings.  
Table 6, finally, makes use of tβ  (instead of itβ ) according to equation (9’). Since tβ  as 
well as explanatory variables could not unambiguously distinguished from nonstationary 
time series by consulting standard unit root tests, a test of cointegration has been per-
formed. We use a test based on the ECM framework. Banerjee et al. (1998) have pub-
lished critical values and have shown the good statistical power of this test. Since trade 
variables have been available only at a quarterly basis, monthly data had to be trans-
formed to a quarterly frequency. Table 6 presents results for “merging the last observation” 
and for “merging by averaging”. Long-run parameters, which are the relevant parameters 
here, turn out to be robust, and confirm our results found in Table 4 and Table 5. The ECM 
parameter γ  is negative,  and rejects the null of non-cointegration in 3 out of 4 cases. 
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Table 4: Dollar exposure of 28 DAX corporations as a linear function of export ratio 
EXQ, import ratio IMQ, and DM/$ exchange rate 
 
Dependent Variable: βit (Dollar Exposure) 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DM / $  
ALLIANZ -0.307 0.052 -5.849 0.0000
BASF -0.395 0.038 -10.341 0.0000
BAYER -0.461 0.046 -10.105 0.0000
BMW -0.554 0.047 -11.892 0.0000
BV -0.242 0.070 -3.451 0.0006
COBA -0.398 0.088 -4.497 0.0000
CONTI -0.417 0.083 -5.019 0.0000
DAIMLER -0.472 0.068 -6.943 0.0000
DEGUSSA -0.667 0.062 -10.796 0.0000
DEUTSCHE -0.348 0.089 -3.929 0.0001
DREBA -0.456 0.081 -5.633 0.0000
DTBAB -0.584 0.079 -7.424 0.0000
HOECHST -0.395 0.033 -12.045 0.0000
HYPO -0.178 0.086 -2.070 0.0386
KARSTADT -0.889 0.080 -11.050 0.0000
KAUFHOF -0.722 0.079 -9.168 0.0000
LINDE -0.452 0.042 -10.808 0.0000
LUFT -0.305 0.061 -5.021 0.0000
MAN -0.771 0.058 -13.230 0.0000
MANNES -0.392 0.063 -6.248 0.0000
METALLGES -0.653 0.057 -11.542 0.0000
PREUSSAG -0.620 0.053 -11.790 0.0000
RWE -0.194 0.041 -4.702 0.0000
SCHERING -0.601 0.064 -9.431 0.0000
SIEMENS -0.273 0.065 -4.200 0.0000
THYSSEN -0.603 0.059 -10.260 0.0000
VEBA -0.047 0.044 -1.073 0.2833
VW 
 
-0.593 0.070 -8.450 0.0000
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Table 4 (continued), dependent Variable:βit (Dollar Exposure) 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t-Statistic Prob.
EXQ  
ALLIANZ 4.098 0.960 4.267 0.0000
BASF 0.448 0.700 0.640 0.5222
BAYER -0.041 0.836 -0.050 0.9605
BMW 3.347 0.853 3.924 0.0001
BV 6.541 1.286 5.085 0.0000
COBA 7.046 1.621 4.348 0.0000
CONTI 6.842 1.521 4.498 0.0000
DAIMLER 9.203 1.246 7.384 0.0000
DEGUSSA 8.285 1.132 7.322 0.0000
DEUTSCHE 7.260 1.623 4.474 0.0000
DREBA 3.534 1.483 2.383 0.0173
DTBAB 7.738 1.441 5.370 0.0000
HOECHST 2.150 0.601 3.578 0.0004
HYPO 10.754 1.573 6.835 0.0000
KARSTADT 3.721 1.474 2.524 0.0117
KAUFHOF 4.625 1.443 3.204 0.0014
LINDE 3.794 0.766 4.955 0.0000
LUFT 0.359 1.111 0.323 0.7468
MAN 4.957 1.067 4.644 0.0000
MANNES 8.760 1.150 7.615 0.0000
METALLGES 1.394 1.036 1.346 0.1785
PREUSSAG 8.860 0.963 9.197 0.0000
RWE 5.798 0.756 7.668 0.0000
SCHERING -3.250 1.167 -2.784 0.0054
SIEMENS 8.594 1.191 7.213 0.0000
THYSSEN -0.314 1.076 -0.292 0.7705
VEBA 8.312 0.808 10.293 0.0000
VW 
 
-1.495 1.285 -1.630 0.2450
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Table 4 (continued), dependent Variable: βit (Dollar Exposure) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
IMQ     
ALLIANZ -1.528 1.355 -1.127 0.2598
BASF -0.049 0.987 -0.050 0.9602
BAYER 1.785 1.180 1.513 0.1305
BMW 1.248 1.204 1.037 0.2999
BV -7.472 1.815 -4.116 0.0000
COBA -8.700 2.287 -3.804 0.0001
CONTI -5.821 2.147 -2.712 0.0068
DAIMLER -10.350 1.759 -5.885 0.0000
DEGUSSA -5.491 1.597 -3.439 0.0006
DEUTSCHE -9.995 2.290 -4.364 0.0000
DREBA -5.106 2.093 -2.439 0.0148
DTBAB -6.414 2.034 -3.154 0.0016
HOECHST 0.016 0.848 0.019 0.9848
HYPO -13.784 2.220 -6.208 0.0000
KARSTADT -5.138 2.080 -2.470 0.0136
KAUFHOF -7.515 2.037 -3.689 0.0002
LINDE -2.687 1.080 -2.487 0.0130
LUFT 2.487 1.568 1.586 0.1128
MAN -0.296 1.506 -0.196 0.8445
MANNES -10.603 1.623 -6.532 0.0000
METALLGES -0.482 1.462 -0.330 0.7415
PREUSSAG -4.279 1.359 -3.147 0.0017
RWE -7.788 1.067 -7.299 0.0000
SCHERING 1.939 1.647 1.177 0.2394
SIEMENS -11.031 1.681 -6.561 0.0000
THYSSEN 0.612 1.518 0.403 0.6869
VEBA -10.888 1.140 -9.554 0.0000
VW 
 
3.795 1.813 2.093 0.0365
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Variable Coefficient  
Fixed Effects     
ALLIANZ -0.246    
BASF 0.777    
BAYER 0.478    
BMW -0.121    
BV 0.584    
COBA 1.080    
CONTI 0.368    
DAIMLER 1.192    
DEGUSSA 0.561    
DEUTSCHE 1.399    
DREBA 1.248    
DTBAB 0.653    
HOECHST 0.132    
HYPO 0.929    
KARSTADT 2.281    
KAUFHOF 2.317    
LINDE 0.621    
LUFT -0.064    
MAN 0.204    
MANNES 1.145    
METALLGES 1.154    
PREUSSAG -0.000    
RWE 0.795    
SCHERING 1.951    
SIEMENS 1.138    
THYSSEN 1.407    
VEBA 0.509    
VW 0.742    
     
R-squared 0.672  Mean dependent var 0.104
Adjusted R-squared 0.652  S.D. dependent var 0.368
S.E. of regression 0.217  Sum squared resid 84.621
Log likelihood 2621.246  F-statistic 51.07627
  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
 
Notes: Sample: Quarterly observations from 28 DAX corporations of the period 1976:i – 1992.iv (1904 ob-
servations). Monthly observations are transformed to quarterly observations by merging last observations. 
Endogenous dollar exposures have been shifted to the centre of their moving window (four years), i.e. they 
enter the estimation as (t+8). Results are based on restricted SUR-estimation.  
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Table 5: Dollar exposure of 28 DAX corporations as a linear function of export ratio 
EXQ, import ratio IMQ, and DM/$ exchange rate; restricted parameters 
 
 Indicator of Dollar exposure 
 β i t t i t β i t β i t  β i t* t i t* 
Constant or FE FE FE 0.54 
(4.7) 
FE FE FE 
EXQ 4.7 
(11.1) 
13.2 
(9.3) 
4.7 
(11.1) 
- 4.5 
(12.1) 
12.0 
(9.7) 
IMQ -3.7 
(6.1) 
-10.1 
(5.0) 
-3.7 
(6.1) 
- -3.4 
(6.6) 
-9.2 
(5.2) 
EXQ-IMQ - - - 4.8 
(11.2) 
- - 
DM / $ -0.43 
(18.2) 
-1.48 
(19.0) 
-0.43 
(18.2) 
-0.42 
(17.7) 
-0.45 
(22.3) 
-1.55 
(23.0) 
2R  0.553 0.560 0.506 0.556 0.559 0.562 
Restriction re-
jected? 
- - yes Yes - - 
 
Notes: SUR estimation based on quarterly observations from 28 DAX corporations of the period 1976:i – 
1992.iv (1904 observations). Monthly observations are transformed to quarterly observations by merging last 
observations; in case of β i t* and t i t* : frequency conversion by averaging monthly observations. Endogenous 
dollar exposures have been shifted to the centre of their moving window (four years), i.e. they enter the esti-
mation as (t+8). FE=“fixed effects”. 
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Table 6: Aggregate Dollar exposure as a linear function of export ratio EXQ, import 
ratio IMQ, and DM/$ exchange rate; ECM-t-Ratio test of cointegration 
 
 
111 )( −−− ∆+′−−=∆ tttt xxc δαβγβ  
  
moving window size: 4 years 
 
 „merge last observation“ „merge by averaging“ 
constant 0.18 
(2.3) 
0.16 
(3.1) 
0.11 
(2.7) 
0.12 
(2.7) 
γ 0.31 
(3.9) 
0.33 
(4.1) 
0.24 
(3.4) 
0.23 
(3.7) 
  
long-run parameters (α ) 
 
EXQ 3.7 
(4.0) 
- 3.1 
(3.3) 
- 
IMQ -4.1 
(2.9) 
- -3.0 
(2.0) 
- 
EXQ-IMQ - 3.5 
(4.2) 
- 3.2 
(2.9) 
Dollar -0.25 
(5.2) 
-0.25 
(5.7) 
-0.25 
(4.8) 
-0.25 
(4.8) 
  
short-run parameters (δ ) 
 
∆ Dollar –1 0.10 
(2.0) 
- - - 
1−∆ β  0.10 
(2.1) 
0.11 
(0.9) 
0.21 
(1.8) 
0.21 
(1.8) 
2R  0.162 0.167 0.140 0.154 
DW 1.81 1.99 2.10 2.10 
Restriction rejected? - no - no 
Crit. Val. 5% 3.82 3.57 3.82 3.57 
Crit. Val. 1% 4.59 4.29 4.59 4.29 
ECM-t-Ratio 3.9* 4.1* 3.4 3.7* 
 
Notes: ECM cointegration test (Banerjee et al., 1998); sample period: quarterly observations of the period 
1976:i – 1992.iv (68 observations. Endogenous dollar exposures have been shifted to the centre of their 
moving window (four years), i.e. they enter the estimation as (t+8). *) Significant at the 5%-level. 
 
 28
 
 
6. Conclusions 
According to many financial market analysts, there should be a negative correlation be-
tween German stock market returns and returns of the Euro/$ exchange rate, respectively 
there should have been a positive correlation between German stock market returns and 
corresponding values of the former DM/$ rate. The supposition is based on Germany’s 
export strength, such that any depreciation of the German/European currency would mean 
good news to German companies. 
In this paper, we have tried to shed some light on the Dollar exposure of German DAX 
corporations. We have estimated several econometric specifications grounded on a time-
variant, APT-based extension of the exchange-rate exposure model in the tradition of 
Adler and Dumas (1980, 1984) and Jorion (1990). Our stock market data consist of 28 per-
formance indices of German DAX corporations. We include macroeconomic risk factors, 
and data on export and import involvement, and we perform econometric panel, GLS, SUR 
and cointegration techniques. Dollar exposures turn out to differ between exporters and 
importers and they are rather unstable over time. While currency exposures are signifi-
cantly negative at the beginning of the 80’s, they change their sign in the late 80’s and 
early 90’s. The negative correlation seems to be a result of the second oil shock and a 
sharply rising dollar, which have induced increasing import costs. The prospect of increas-
ing prices for foreign inputs apparently had a negative impact on stock prices. The positive 
association reflects the rising German trade surplus from the mid-eighties on which has let 
exporters more strongly profit from a rising dollar. 
Thus, in contrast to most previous studies in the literature that find little evidence of expo-
sure, we confirm results of Dominguez and Tesar (2001) who report that higher foreign 
involvement corresponds to higher exposure at least in Germany. Our additional finding 
suggests that exposure also depends on the prevailing level of the Dollar exchange rate.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: APT-modelling: Sensitivity to “business climate” 
 04/77-12/79 01/80-12/85 01/86-12/90 01/91-03/95 
Allianz  -0.037808 0.000218 0.021181 -0.006400 
 (-6.056247) (0.045478) (4.084276) (-1.444770) 
BASF  -0.005132 0.002656 0.004328 -0.001976 
 (-0.711987) (0.805184) (0.889396) (-0.468190) 
Bayer  -0.004052 0.002304 0.006864 0.009234 
 (-0.605755) (0.849288) (1.476547) (2.286698) 
BMW  -0.014307 0.001587 0.004833 0.008975 
 (-1.386800) (0.345780) (0.720741) (1.589014) 
Bayer. Vereinsbank  -0.025602 0.003283 0.016096 0.001252 
 (-2.934911) (0.960529) (3.447230) (0.298751) 
Commerzbank  -0.015109 0.006609 0.012667 0.002861 
 (-2.226771) (1.474257) (2.513174) (0.783602) 
Continental  -0.007681 0.008637 0.006474 0.005449 
 (-0.484700) (1.444075) (0.693160) (0.760279) 
Daimler-Benz  -0.009903 0.006638 0.014661 0.012636 
 (-1.495731) (1.801508) (2.612782) (2.927361) 
Degussa  -0.006621 -0.000336 0.007978 -0.004601 
 (-0.921201) (-0.081165) (1.119602) (-0.871308) 
Deutsche Bank  -0.019420 0.005730 0.016151 -0.001223 
 (-3.257705) (1.634590) (2.910664) (-0.379376) 
Dresdner Bank  -0.011780 0.006789 0.016005 -0.001254 
 (-2.032117) (1.622943) (3.398943) (-0.357835) 
Deutsche Babcock  -0.030232 0.004803 0.002618 -0.001999 
 (-3.200422) (0.828826) (0.319059) (-0.304095) 
Hoechst  -0.005126 0.004315 0.010924 0.000769 
 (-0.636510) (1.608288) (2.030225) (0.175424) 
Hypobank  -0.016391 0.009554 0.016238 0.001263 
 (-2.187269) (1.978922) (3.309445) (0.334045) 
Karstadt  0.001428 0.007744 -0.005823 -0.006999 
 (0.115808) (-1.370526) (-0.682933) (-1.278536) 
Kaufhof  -0.006487 0.003558 -0.008106 -0.000389 
 (-0.532033) (0.702268) (-1.013207) (-0.065383) 
Linde -0.041523 -0.000727 0.014549 -0.003222 
 (-4.760518) (-0.223464) (3.053431) (-0.823440) 
Lufthansa  -0.004446 0.008045 0.011969 0.003101 
 (-0.264911) (1.408628) (1.551473) (0.346309) 
MAN  -0.028979 0.004086 0.019093 0.009400 
 (-3.433244) (0.004086) (2.345312) (1.704461) 
Mannesmann  -0.004473 0.007888 0.021195 0.011987 
 (-0.433193) (1.874838) (2.625758) (2.151401) 
Metallgesellschaft  -0.037678 0.006883 0.023443 0.012182 
 (-3.158826) (1.357734) (2.801088) (1.110943) 
Preussag  -0.030627 0.009652 0.030164 0.004824 
 (-2.127880) (-1.677105) (3.313558) (0.761658) 
RWE  -0.017358 0.003106 0.002794 -0.008914 
 (-2.003099) (0.900312) (0.383519) (-2.343336) 
Schering  0.011166 -0.007572 0.011055 0.004586 
 (1.007141) (-2.106714) (1.676620) (0.820756) 
Siemens  -0.019537 0.003608 0.021165 -0.000591 
 (-3.840200) (1.316164) (3.852693) (-0.181074) 
Thyssen  0.005684 0.006568 0.009752 0.019680 
 (0.517758) (1.230938) (1.451967) (3.405292) 
VEBA  -0.041710 0.008074 0.010177 -0.001006 
 (-3.862136) (2.300695) (1.943665) (-0.261166) 
VW  -0.021309 0.011574 0.016514 0.016235 
 (-1.885862) (2.089541) (2.559311) (2.497194) 
 
Notes: APT factor sensitivities estimated using the procedure described in chapter 2, eqn. (2) – (4). t-
statistics in parentheses. 
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Table A2: APT-modelling: Sensitivity to inflation 
 04/77-12/79 01/80-12/85 01/86-12/90 01/91-03/95 
Allianz -2.562619 -4.207588 -1.704562 8.391110 
 (-1.139575) (-1.628070) (-0.569462) (5.945107) 
BASF  -4.912299 -0.112472 -1.950335 5.096868 
 (-1.892373) (-0.063093) (-0.697900) (4.629656) 
Bayer  -7.863918 -2.760371 -4.986297 2.698319 
 (-3.262143) (-1.883117) (-1.834363) (2.367297) 
BMW  -5.972126 -3.622408 -2.215328 4.025023 
 (-1.607506) (-1.461138) (-0.556279) (2.679085) 
Bayer. Vereinsbank  -3.952464 -3.698605 -4.127887 5.346297 
 (-1.258992) (-2.002566) (-1.549807) (4.480344) 
Commerzbank  -1.168826 -2.636571 -3.399644 4.667351 
 (-0.478019) (-1.087116) (-1.185620) (4.302154) 
Continental  -1.284306 -4.559430 -3.180366 3.995226 
 (-0.224682) (-1.410883) (-0.599250) (2.059594) 
Daimler-Benz  -7.732466 1.470096 -9.678805 4.403909 
 (-3.242119) (0.736288) (-2.984303) (3.201607) 
Degussa  -4.043052 -1.070851 -1.168919 5.490750 
 (-1.562409) (-0.478368) (-0.274179) (3.836988) 
Deutsche Bank  -2.907208 -2.816861 -5.645212 5.844345 
 (-1.355014) (-1.486504) (-1.748574) (5.968609) 
Dresdner Bank  -6.179998 -4.888743 -0.371073 5.499666 
 (-2.961972) (-2.158048) (-0.135466) (5.138584) 
Deutsche Babcock  2.979087 5.863190 -3.235105 9.020569 
 (0.875206) (-1.867910) (-0.682355) (4.986530) 
Hoechst  -6.159668 -2.162964 -3.976949 5.178930 
 (-2.122340) (-1.491359) (-1.269849) (4.645982) 
Hypobank  -2.372182 -5.932031 -6.104263 5.891808 
 (-0.879327) (-2.271468) (-2.173483) (5.086090) 
Karstadt  -13.45788 -4.446943 1.774349 3.443173 
 (-3.031070) (-1.455499) (0.356633) (1.986493) 
Kaufhof  -14.48828 -4.705350 2.777547 6.288466 
 (-3.299988) (-1.718676) (0.573227) (3.199158) 
Linde 1.585603 -0.577846 -0.100556 5.663656 
 (0.504115) (-0.328579) (-0.037343) (4.695808) 
Lufthansa  -5.768072 -11.44680 -2.027017 4.662036 
 (-0.954945) (-3.687992) (-0.458797) (2.051522) 
MAN  3.096887 -1.514339 -1.208915 3.865769 
 (1.017408) (-0.630077) (-0.261523) (2.181367) 
Mannesmann  -8.400767 -1.813177 -2.183424 4.327588 
 (-2.255851) (-0.797682) (-0.471031) (2.890596) 
Metallgesellschaft  -0.985271 -0.045272 6.744132 8.474352 
 (-0.229420) (-0.016525) (1.382826) (2.156620) 
Preussag  -9.504113 -1.352553 7.917035 2.889504 
 (-1.834855) (-0.434453) (1.429599) (1.574442) 
RWE  2.696646 -3.051313 4.649981 5.776350 
 (0.863697) (-1.636452) (1.062894) (5.279105) 
Schering  -7.622816 -2.357077 1.483030 3.102239 
 (-1.908382) (-1.209594) (0.389091) (2.232727) 
Siemens  -1.576070 -5.425008 -3.597979 4.906491 
 (-0.859439) (-3.656648) (-1.150874) (5.570770) 
Thyssen  -7.038219 -2.709193 -0.645119 2.931726 
 (-1.778059) (-0.939999) (-0.169050) (1.777640) 
VEBA  -7.491346 -0.745175 0.109741 3.978945 
 (-1.922802) (-0.392919) (0.037038) (3.548902) 
VW  -7.979597 -2.865680 -8.711869 5.047158 
 (-1.959804) (-0.956542) (-2.291628) (2.733066) 
 
Notes: APT factor sensitivities estimated using the procedure described in chapter 2, eqn. (2) – (4). t-
statistics in parentheses. 
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Table A3: APT-modelling: Sensitivity to the term structure 
 04/77-12/79 01/80-12/85 01/86-12/90 01/91-03/95 
Allianz  -1.310459 -1.865668 -5.194704 -11.21016 
 (-1.496661) (-1.929210) (-4.186206) (-5.682718) 
BASF  -2.493986 -1.382845 -2.687058 -5.716532 
 (-2.465395) (-2.073604) (-0.697900) (-3.047428) 
Bayer  -1.720128 -1.425935 -3.579248 -3.871451 
 (-1.834820) (-2.599502) (-3.213612) (-2.155605) 
BMW  -0.035953 -0.781879 -2.077894 -6.203242 
 (-0.024837) (-0.842697) (-1.291402) (-2.470894) 
Bayer. Vereinsbank  0.000175 -1.078173 -5.054664 -9.380692 
 (0.000143) (-1.560005) (-4.529271) (-5.032006) 
Commerzbank  -1.243738 -2.015278 -4.855552 -6.141989 
 (-1.308050) (-2.224031) (-4.031853) (-3.780611) 
Continental  -0.113345 -1.965694 -2.765700 -9.265576 
 (-0.051133) (-1.625420) (-1.239373) (-2.908140) 
Daimler-Benz  1.604563 -0.112589 -5.540447 -7.973133 
 (1.728175) (-0.151227) (-4.125930) (-4.147560) 
Degussa  -2.238007 -0.328849 -0.890473 -5.619599 
 (-2.218434) (-0.392597) (-0.520332) (-2.393759) 
Deutsche Bank  -1.389460 -2.460347 -6.412475 -7.961788 
 (-1.659128) (-3.471291) (-4.825724) (-5.549343) 
Dresdner Bank  -1.661779 -2.866052 -5.353727 -6.362636 
 (-2.040478) (-3.390079) (-4.748004) (-4.077856) 
Deutsche Babcock  -1.332694 0.851955 -2.215563 -9.517714 
 (-1.006578) (0.727553) (-1.128327) (-3.256764) 
Hoechst  -3.564580 -1.907696 -1.747473 -5.578516 
 (-3.158524) (-3.517035) (-1.356203) (-2.863149) 
Hypobank  0.266294 -0.742870 -5.386441 -8.030865 
 (0.253076) (-0.761225) (-4.591753) (-4.769906) 
Karstadt  -2.710569 0.062974 -4.231178 0.210493 
 (-1.567269) (0.055129) (-2.071556) (0.086345) 
Kaufhof  -1.501035 -1.142507 -5.259155 2.398557 
 (-0.877160) (-1.115338) (-2.733600) (0.905022) 
Linde 0.100381 -0.654978 -3.079640 -4.707531 
 (0.082232) (-0.996179) (-2.706637) (-2.702560) 
Lufthansa  -3.284558 -0.485598 -1.727243 -11.35674 
 (-1.393325) (-0.421118) (-0.936413) (-2.854502) 
MAN  0.088553 -1.822918 -4.536211 -9.506939 
 (0.074969) (-2.030669) (-2.332409) (-3.870534) 
Mannesmann  -2.265588 -0.879254 -5.869965 -6.841233 
 (-1.568356) (-1.033497) (-3.040740) (-2.762225) 
Metallgesellschaft  -0.755498 0.115980 -0.576691 1.473586 
 (-0.451207) (0.113152) (-0.287698) (0.301249) 
Preussag  0.512858 -1.175943 0.361665 -4.946992 
 (0.253587) (-1.010799) (0.165143) (-1.755849) 
RWE  -2.417548 -1.010799 -5.434959 -4.622722 
 (-1.990042) (-0.487107) (-3.105762) (-2.731842) 
Schering  -2.732853 -2.516609 -4.760925 -5.537031 
 (-1.758058) (-3.465858) (-3.017140) (-2.230555) 
Siemens  -2.571130 -0.487401 -3.753835 -5.235493 
 (-3.608229) (-0.879681) (-2.859607) (-3.608663) 
Thyssen  -4.257975 -1.050679 -2.546323 -7.144126 
 (-2.770621) (-0.973698) (-1.586835) (-2.779178) 
VEBA  -0.212407 -0.170052 -1.944063 -4.757537 
 (-0.140644) (-0.239664) (-1.554711) (-2.776617) 
VW  2.111389 -3.391726 -3.424896 -5.757580 
 (1.333219) (-3.029085) (-2.213706) (-1.991120) 
 
Notes: APT factor sensitivities estimated using the procedure described in chapter 2, eqn. (2) – (4). t-
statistics in parentheses. 
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Table A4: APT-modelling: Sensitivity to the residual market factor 
 04/77-12/79 01/80-12/85 01/86-12/90 01/91-03/95 
Allianz 0.871771 1.452645 1.277198 1.279106 
 (5.492081) (9.854710) (14.69842) (9.497071) 
BASF  0.712715 0.910422 0.843724 1.130005 
 (3.883372) (8.950020) (10.34569) (8.836085) 
Bayer  1.113212 1.003411 0.876608 0.909046 
 (6.557257) (12.00269) (11.26068) (7.420565) 
BMW  1.761988 1.034157 1.308202 1.286657 
 (6.709928) (7.315605) (11.65904) (7.516651) 
Bayer. Vereinsbank  0.979477 0.894315 1.103114 0.966817 
 (4.397832) (8.490150) (14.09278) (7.602904) 
Commerzbank  1.120024 1.523373 0.980945 0.932421 
 (6.505246) (10.98139) (11.60897) (8.411159) 
Continental  1.771611 1.199462 0.753869 0.732019 
 (4.424896) (6.508466) (4.813959) (3.369332) 
Daimler-Benz  0.994767 1.323645 1.300288 1.307453 
 (5.910958) (11.54794) (13.83105) (9.961587) 
Degussa  0.874055 0.961320 0.859478 1.229109 
 (4.773869) (7.528789) (7.209689) (7.677863) 
Deutsche Bank  0.848008 1.360653 1.064982 0.981337 
 (5.573159) (12.57888) (11.45839) (10.02222) 
Dresdner Bank  0.713554 1.513640 1.137031 0.884119 
 (4.822291) (11.65724) (14.41664) (8.302374) 
Deutsche Babcock  1.055325 1.164041 1.020927 1.557132 
 (4.400920) (6.465452) (7.426159) (7.812853) 
Hoechst  0.823543 1.010502 0.777655 1.185061 
 (4.030127) (12.20360) (8.629285) (8.922982) 
Hypobank  0.972797 1.033099 1.113213 1.023140 
 (5.091741) (6.918197) (13.53643) (8.903657) 
Karstadt  0.989688 0.707287 0.977536 0.891425 
 (3.155409) (4.052545) (6.845279) (5.356067) 
Kaufhof  1.438526 0.775753 0.880914 1.536207 
 (4.632716) (4.967023) (6.585420) (8.486964) 
Linde 1.309768 0.978386 0.977718 1.169388 
 (5.936082) (9.738289) (12.23581) (9.835662) 
Lufthansa  1.146274 0.637749 1.081031 0.974309 
 (2.676625) (3.555675) (8.360482) (3.592708) 
MAN  1.535757 1.163776 1.118500 1.162344 
 (7.194000) (8.460785) (8.194385) (6.930601) 
Mannesmann  1.528651 1.100323 1.154220 1.330889 
 (5.857201) (8.490648) (8.532539) (7.880702) 
Metallgesellschaft  1.755691 0.819809 1.287927 1.665545 
 (5.777079) (5.244904) (9.188124) (4.981233) 
Preussag  1.180039 0.942932 1.150227 1.133981 
 (3.210572) (5.296979) (7.559103) (5.899637) 
RWE  0.670998 0.625544 0.825636 1.005281 
 (3.048751) (5.880106) (6.777041) (8.708476) 
Schering  1.223797 1.103938 0.958472 0.822194 
 (4.344750) (9.856036) (8.676193) (4.859684) 
Siemens  0.899957 1.212563 1.194540 1.046331 
 (6.979635) (14.27769) (12.96975) (10.57656) 
Thyssen  1.389852 1.075179 1.025764 1.263599 
 (5.001628) (6.547216) (9.109022) (7.206072) 
VEBA  0.332112 0.802119 0.813405 0.915546 
 (1.217957) (7.413012) (9.264314) (7.831997) 
VW  2.040186 1.279086 1.312754 1.296567 
 (7.113015) (7.469244) (12.15317) (6.573379) 
 
Notes: APT factor sensitivities estimated using the procedure described in chapter 2, eqn. 
(2) – (4). t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table A5: APT-modelling: estimated risk premia  
 
 04/77-12/79 01/80-12/85 01/86-12/90 01/91-03/95 04/77-3/95 
Business 
climate 
-0.213603 0.108629 -0.003178 -0.977582 -0.006482 
 (-3.424870) (0.224226) (-0.015727) (-0.855645) (-0.775972) 
Inflation 0.001246 0.001719 0.001387 -0.009511 -0.000182 
 (6.022274) (1.230012) (3.298397) (-1.128937) (-0.293946) 
0.001694 -0.003828 -0.001016 -0.001968 -0.002098 Interest 
rate term 
structure (2.660712) (-1.490610) (-0.861853) (-0.999591) (-1.823590) 
Dollar 0.033745 0.235939 -0.002807 -0.042578 0.038019 
 (3.262461) (2.306820) (-0.250563) (-0.907591) (2.327922) 
0.001876 0.038074 -0.000541 0.049311 0.002529 Residual 
market 
factor (1.137838) (3.538150) (-0.108985) (1.217405) (1.105950) 
 
Notes: APT risk premia estimated using the procedure described in chapter 2, eqn. (2) – (4). t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
